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Abstract
RT is a framework for Role-based Trust Manage-
ment [20]. In comparison with systems like SPKI/SDSI
and KeyNote, the advantages of RT include: a declarative,
logic-based semantic foundation, support for vocabulary
agreement, strongly-typed credentials and policies, more
ﬂexible delegation structures, and more expressive support
for Separation-of-Duty policies.
This paper describes advances in the RT framework
that broaden its applicability and presents RTML, an XML-
based data representation for RT policies and credentials.
Improvements in RT include new data types to encode per-
missions involving structured resources and ranges, restric-
tive inheritance of roles for ﬂexible reﬁnement of permis-
sions, and notions of identity roles and identity-based roles
for enforcing separation-of-duty when a physical user holds
multiple keys. RTML establishes a precise format for RT
credentials and policies, facilitating deployment of the RT
framework.
1 Introduction
RT is a framework for Role-based Trust Management.
The framework comprises several sub-languages, described
in previous papers [20, 21]. RT credentials deﬁne role
membership and may delegate authority to add additional
members to a role. RT’s notion of role is more general than
typically used in Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [23].
Roles in RT are localized to each principal, can have pa-
rameters, and can express concepts such as identity in sys-
tems like X.509 [14], role and permission in RBAC, name
and authorization in SPKI/SDSI [11], and attribute in at-
tribute certiﬁcates.
One distinguishing feature of the RT framework is that it
directly addresses the issue of vocabulary agreement. When
credential chains delegate access permissions of resources,
allthe principals involved in the chain need to use consistent
terminology to specify resource permissions and delegation
conditions. When different credential issuers use incom-
patible schemes, their credentials cannot be meaningfully
combined. Some intended permissions may not be granted,
or, when schemes intended for different purposes acciden-
tally interact, unintended authorization may follow. Some
systems do not address this issue at all; others try to come
up with one vocabulary for all applications. Our philosophy
is that, although different applications often share common
policy concepts, they need to be able to use different vocab-
ularies. In RT, we address this issue through a scheme in-
spired by XML namespaces [7]. We introduce application
domain speciﬁcation documents (ADSDs). Each ADSD is
globally uniquely identiﬁed by a URI, and deﬁnes a suite
of related data types and role names, called a vocabulary.
1Credentials, when using a role name, refer to the ADSD in
which the role name is declared. This enables RT to have
strongly typed credentials and policies. This feature helps
ensure interoperability and reduce the possibility of errors
in writing policies and credentials and unintended interac-
tion of credentials.
In the process of turning the design of RT [20] into a
system that can be used by several projects, we extended
the design in the following ways.
First, two new categories of data types are added: tree
types and record types. Tree types can be used to represent
structured resources like ﬁle hierarchies, DNS names, etc.
Record types can be used to group logically related ﬁelds
together, e.g., an address may be deﬁned using a record type
that contains ﬁelds such as street number, zip code, etc. The
credential safety requirements is also relaxed. These exten-
sions enable one to represent permissions that involve struc-
tured resources and ranges, without sacriﬁcing the tractabil-
ity property.
Second, we add the notion of restrictive inheritance
among roles to support ﬂexible reﬁnement of permissions.
Consider the following example in SPKI. A ﬁrewall dele-
gates to KA the permission “(connect cs.stanford.edu)” and
allows KA to further delegate. KA in turn delegates these
rights to KB. Now if KB grants to KC the permission
“(connect cs.stanford.edu 80)”, which is augmented with
a port number, one can conclude that the ﬁrewall autho-
rizes KC to connect to the host through the given port. It
is straightforward to achieve this in RT by encoding these
permissions using a role with the name “connect” and two
parameters: host and port. However, suppose the ﬁrewall
administrator ﬁrst declares the connect role to take the host
parameter, alone, and later, after KA has delegated the con-
nect role to KB, realizes the need for adding the port param-
eter. In this case we want to avoid requiring KA to issue its
delegation again, as is the case with the original design of
RT. This is achieved by declaring another role, say, “con-
nect2” to inherit “connect”. (This is a restrictive form of
inheritance, in that membership in connect2 implies autho-
rization to fewer resources than does membership in con-
nect.) This approach achieves the ﬂexibility of untyped cre-
dentials without giving up the other advantages of strong
typing.
Third, we now explicitly address the relationships be-
tween physical users and principals (keys). RT has man-
ifold roles and exclusive product, designed to support Sepa-
ration of Duty policies, which require that two or more dif-
ferent people be responsible for the completion of a sensi-
tive task. This purpose could be defeated in the original RT
design by a user possessing multiple keys. To address this
issue, we introduce identity roles and identity-based roles.
In this paper, we also present RTML version 1, an XML-
based data representation of the RT framework with the
above describedextensions. (Weomit“version1”intherest
of this paper.) This work on RTML, ﬂeshing out the design
of RT, involves efforts from three research projects, with
focuses on trust management, attribute-based access con-
trol, and automated trust negotiation. Each of the projects
found previous public-key certiﬁcation systems such as
X.509, SPKI/SDSI, and KeyNote [3] too limited in one way
or another [20, 25, 27]. RTML’s main purpose is to be used
as an alternative to these systems.
A major design decision in RTML is how ADSDs and
credentials interact. We explored the possibility of mak-
ing ADSDs themselves XML schemas [12], but settled on
making both ADSDs and credentials XML documents. One
can think of ADSDs as .h ﬁles in C programs and cre-
dentials as .c ﬁles. Data types and role names are de-
clared in ADSDs, and credentials must use these role names
in a type-consistent way. The RTML system includes an
XML schema document that deﬁnes the syntax of ADSDs
and credentials.1 The RTML system also has a predeﬁned
ADSD which includes data types for representing com-
monly used basic types, distinguished names, email ad-
dresses, DNS names, and ﬁle paths; this ADSD is provided
in Appendix B.1.
1.1 Scenarios
In the following, we use three example scenarios to il-
lustrate what can be expressed in RT. In these scenarios,
we assume that public key certiﬁcates are used. None of
the three scenarios can be fully captured using SPKI/SDSI,
KeyNote, or attribute certiﬁcates. The latter two cannot be
expressed in the original design of RT in [20] and require
the new extensions introduced in this paper. We will show
how to express these scenarios in Section 3.
Scenario 1 (Linking Delegation and Intersection) A ﬁc-
titious Web publishing service, EPub, offers a discount to
anyone who is both a graduate student and an ACM member
since 2001. EPub delegates the authority over the identiﬁca-
tion of students to entities that EPub believes are legitimate
universities. EPub additionally delegates the authority over
identifying universities to a ﬁctitious Accrediting Board for
Universities, ABU. Bob is an ACM member and a master
student of StateU, which is accredited by ABU.
EPub knows the public key of ACM and ABU. The pub-
lic key of StateU, which issues Bob’s student credential,
should be certiﬁed in StateU’s accrediting credential. Fur-
thermore, EPub requires that the same university name ap-
pears in both its accreditation credential and the student’s
credential. Similarly, EPub requires that the same student
name appears in both the ACM member credential and the
student credential.
1The schema is available at the following URL:
http://crypto.stanford.edu/˜ninghui/rtml/RTMLv1.0q.xsd
2Scenario 2 (Controlled Delegation of Permissions) A
ﬁrewall FW issues a credential to give a system admin, SA,
the authority to grant to anyone who has a Stanford ID per-
mission to connect to the host “cs.stanford.edu” and to any
host in the domain “cs.stanford.edu”. The permission is ex-
pressed using a role with one parameter, “host”. Later, FW
wants to further parameterizes the permission by adding the
port parameter. SA now grants to Alice, who has a Stan-
ford ID, the permission to connect to any host in the domain
“stanford.edu” at any port between 8000 and 8443. Then,
when Alice requests to connect to the host “cs.stanford.edu”
at port 8443, FW should allow this connection.
NotethatSAcaneffectivelydelegateonlytoentitieswho
have Stanford IDs. This is what we call a controlled dele-
gation. In fact, when SA does not have a Stanford ID, he
will not be able to get any connection permission by using
the credential issued to him, although he can manage the
permission.
Scenario 3 (Identity-based Separation of Duty) A bank
FB has three roles: manager, cashier, and auditor. FB’s pol-
icy requires that a certain transaction be approved by a man-
ager, two cashiers, and an auditor. The two cashiers must be
different. A manager who is also a cashier can serve as one
of the two cashiers. And the auditor must be different from
the other parties in the transaction.
The intention of the policy is to require different users,
who are members of appropriate roles, to be jointly respon-
sible for a transaction. A further complication arises when
a physical user may possess multiple public keys. We want
to ensure that the transaction is approved by distinct users,
rather than distinct keys. To make this possible, we assume
that FB assigns a unique employee number to each user, and
every key that a user possesses is certiﬁed to be associated
with the user’s employee number.
1.2 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Back-
ground information is given in Section 2. In Section 3, we
show how to express the three scenarios described in Sec-
tion 1.1 and explain the new extensions added to RT. In
Section 4, we describe RTML. We then discuss related work
in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6.
2 Background
In this section, we give background information on trust
management and the RT framework.
2.1 Trust Management
The term “trust management” was introduced in [5] to
group together several principles in dealing with authoriza-
tion in decentralized distributed systems. Some of these
principles appeared in earlier work on distributed access
control, e.g., [1, 16]. The concept of trust management
is later used and extended in several systems [3, 4, 6, 9, 11,
17, 20, 21].
In the “trust-management” approach, a requester submits
a request to an authorizer, who speciﬁes access rules (also
calledpolicies), whichgovernaccesstoprotectedresources;
then the authorizer and the requester jointly compute a set
of credentials to be used in this request. Finally the autho-
rizer decides whether to authorize this request by answering
the proof-of-compliance question: “Do the access rules and
credentials authorize the request?”
A TM system has a TM language for specifying creden-
tials and access rules. A TM system also needs a process of
computing which credentials to use in an authorization pro-
cedure; this is often called credential (or certiﬁcate) chain
discovery [9]. When credentials are stored in a distributed
manner, the discovery process needs to consider how to lo-
cate these credentials [21]. When credentials and/or access
rules are considered sensitive, the discovery process may
be carried out by using a “automated trust negotiation” pro-
cess [24, 27, 28, 29].
A TM system also needs a proof-of-compliance check-
ing program. A chain discovery program can also be used
for proof-of-compliance, since if it can discover a chain, it
certainly can verify that the chain is valid. However, a com-
pliance checking program can often be simpler, since it is
often not difﬁcult to have the discovery program produce a
chain that is organized in a way such that checking the chain
is easier. These programs can be used as services indepen-
dent of applications or embedded in applications.
2.2 History of the RT framework
The design of RT was inﬂuenced by systems like the
logic for access control in [1, 16], SPKI/SDSI [11, 22], and
Delegation Logic [17, 18]. The most basic part of RT, RT0,
was presented in [21], together with algorithms that search
for chains of RT0 credentials, and a type system about cre-
dential storage that ensures chains can be found among
credentials whose storage is distributed. A trust negotia-
tion protocol that supports RT0 credentials was introduced
in [27]. Four additional components of the RT frame-
work were introduced in [20]: RT1, RT2, RTT, and RTD.
RT1 adds to RT0 parameterized roles. RT2 adds to RT1
logical objects, which can group logically related objects
together so that permissions about them can be assigned
together. RTT provides manifold roles and role-product
operators, which can express separation-of-duty policies.
RTD provides delegation of role activations, which can ex-
press selective use of capacities and delegation of these ca-
pacities. In [19], Constraint DATALOG is used to extend
3RT1 with the ability to express permissions regarding struc-
tured resources and ranges, while at the same time ensuring
tractability of evaluating implications of access rules and
credentials.
In this paper, we describe RTML version 1, which imple-
ments constraint-enhanced RTT
1 in the RT framework[20];
itdoes not yet have RT2 orRTD. On the other hand, RTML
extends the original design to address several practical is-
sues, as discussed in Section 1.
In RTML, access rules are similar to credentials and only
involve properties of requesters. This sufﬁces for some ap-
plications. In other applications, access rules may include
other conditions of access, such as current time, application
state, auditing requirements, etc. RTML does not yet sup-
port these features. In those applications, RTML may still
be used for expressing credentials.
2.3 Background of RT
A principal2 can issue credentials and make requests.
RT assumes that it can be veriﬁed that a principal indeed
issued a particular credential or request. The most typical
kind of principals are public keys, but RT does not man-
date so. In some environments, a principal could also be,
say, a symmetric key or a user account. In one web-based
ﬁle sharing demonstration application we developed, user
ids are used as principals.
The most important concept in RT is that of roles. Roles
in RT are localized to principals. Each principal has its own
authority name space for roles; this is the same as localized
name spaces in SDSI. One needs to use a principal and a
role term to refer to a role, e.g., KA.R, in which KA is a
principal and R is a role term. In the simplest case, a role
term just contains the name of role. More generally, a role
term may contain parameters. A role KA.R can be read
as KA’s R role. Only KA has the authority to deﬁne the
members of the role KA.R, and KA does so by issuing role-
deﬁnition credentials. A role may be deﬁned by multiple
credentials; the effect is that of union.
RT has single-element roles and manifold roles. The se-
mantics of a single-element role is a set of principals. The
notion of single-element roles uniﬁes several concepts in
access control and trust management literature, including
groups in many systems, identity in identity certiﬁcation
systems such as X.509, roles and permissions in RBAC,
names in SDSI, authorization tags in SPKI, and attributes
in attribute certiﬁcates. It is possible to unify these concepts
because the common mathematical underpinning of the se-
mantics of these concepts is sets of principals. A group is
clearly a set of principals. An identity is a set of principals
corresponding to one physical user; some systems require
2Principals are called entities in earlier papers on RT [20, 21]; here we
use “principal” to avoid potential confusion with entities in XML.
the set to contain just one principal. (The notion of iden-
tity and the relationship between users and principals will
be further explored in Section 3.3.) A role in RBAC can be
viewed as a set of principals who are members of this role;
role hierarchy relationships can be viewed as ways to deﬁne
role memberships.3 A permission corresponds to a set of
principals who have the permission. Granting a permission
to a principal amounts to making the principal a member of
the set corresponding to the permission. Granting a permis-
sion to a role amounts to asserting that the set corresponding
to the permission includes as a subset the set corresponding
to the role. A name in SDSI is also resolved to a set of
principals. An attribute is a set of principals who have the
attribute.
The notion of manifold roles generalizes that of single-
element roles to allow each member of the role to be a
principal set, instead of a principal. That the principal set
{K1,K2} is a member of the manifold role KA.R means
that K1 and K2 together have the privileges associated with
KA.R, but either one of them acting alone may not have
that privilege. The semantics of a manifold role is a set
of principal sets. Manifold roles are introduced to support
Separation of Duty policies [8, 26] in a more expressive way
than do threshold structures.
3 Extensions to RT
In the following subsections, we present the new exten-
sions to RT by describing how to express the policies asso-
ciated with each of the three application scenarios given in
Section 1.1.
3.1 Linking Delegation and Intersection
ABU, the ﬁctitious accrediting board for universities,
creates an ADSD, in which two roles are declared: uni-
versity (which has only one parameter: name) and student
(which has ﬁve parameters: university, department, pro-
gram, id, and name). ACM creates an ADSD and declares
one role: acmMember, which has four parameters: name,
class, number, and since. EPub creates an ADSD for its
own use, which declares a new role discount and includes
the two ADSDs by ABU and ACM.
The credentials, access rules, and conclusions drawn
from them, are given in Figure 1 in an abstract syn-
tax. Line (1) represents the accrediting credential of
3This view of a role loses some of the meaning that can be associated
with a role in RBAC, e.g., constraints. Constraints like mutually exclusive
roles are implemented in RTML by using manifold roles. Constraints
like cardinality constraints can be associated with the set reading of roles,
but they do not exist in RTML. These constraints can be implemented by
applicationsthatuseRTMLandcheckedwhencredentialsarebeingissued.
Other constraints, like mutually exclusive permission are lost from the set
reading.
4Credentials:
KABU.university(name=‘StateU’) ←− KStateU (1)
KStateU.student(university=‘StateU’, name=‘Bob Smith’, program=‘M.S.’, ···) ←− KBob (2)
KACM.acmMember(number=‘UJ12345’, name=’Bob Smith’, since=2000, ···) ←− KBob (3)
Access rules of EPub
discount ←− KACM.acmMember(name=?X, since≤2001) ∩ student(name=?X, program∈{‘M.S.’, ‘Ph.D.’}) (4)
university() ⇐= KABU (5)
student(university=?X) ⇐= university(name=?X) (6)
From (1) and (5), EPub concludes that: university(name=‘StateU’) ←−KStateU (7)
From (6) and (7), EPub concludes that: student(university=‘StateU’) ⇐= KStateU (8)
From (2) and (8), EPub concludes that: student(university=‘StateU’, name=‘Bob Smith’, ···) ←−KBob (9)
From (3), (4), and (9), EPub concludes that: discount ←−KBob (10)
Figure 1. Scenario 1: Linking Delegation and Intersection
StateU. It means that KStateU is a member of the role
“KABU.university(name=‘StateU’)”. Line (2) represents
Bob’s student credential issued by StateU. Line (3) repre-
sents Bob’s ACM member credential.
Line (4) represents EPub’s discount policy: Anyone who
is both an ACM member since 2001 and a graduate student
is entitled to the discount, and the name in the two creden-
tials should be the same. Note that not all parameters appear
in the role term for acmMember; only those that need to be
constrained have to appear. The same is true for the role
term for student. The RTML encoding of this policy in in-
cluded in Appendix B.2.
Line (5) encodes EPub’s delegation over the university
role to KABU; this is called a simple delegation. The
role term “university()” has no parameter at all, because
the name parameter is not constrained. This delegation
means that any principal that is a member of the role
KABU.university(name=X) is also a member of EPub’s
university(name=X) role. In other words, it implies that the
simple containment “university()←−KABU.university()”.
When no restrictive inheritance is involved, these two are
indeed equivalent. And the delegation syntax is simply a
convenient syntactic sugar. In Section 3.3, we will illustrate
their differences.
Line (6) encodes EPub’s delegation over the identiﬁca-
tion of students of a university to principals who are certi-
ﬁed to be that university. This is called a linking delegation.
This implies that for any principal K and university name
X, if K is a member of EPub’s “university(name=X)”
role, then EPub delegates the authority over the role
“student(university=X)” to K.
3.2 Controlled Delegation of Permissions
Assume that a role, stanfordID, is declared in some
ADSD; the details of the parameters of the stanfordID role
are not important in this scenario. In another ADSD, a host-
Perm role is declared and has one parameter: host. The
type of the “host” parameter is “dns”, which is pre-declared
by the RTML system. (One can also use a type declared
in the current ADSD via the type declaration mechanism
provided by RTML.) In another ADSD, a socketPerm role
is declared to restrictively inherit hostPerm, and a new pa-
rameter “port” is added, which has the pre-declared type
“unsigned short”.
Figure 2 gives the access rule, credentials, and some im-
plications of them. Line (1) represents the delegation from
FW to SA. The role KStanford.stanfordID() is called the
scope of this delegation. Line (2) represents the delegation
from SA to Alice. Line (3) represent Alice’s Stanford ID
credential. RTML encoding of the two ADSDs declaring
hostPerm and socketPerm and credentials (2) and (3) are
included in Appendix B.3.
When socketPerm is the only role that restrictively in-
herits hostPerm, then credential (1) is equivalent to the two
credentials (4) and (5). The request, as represented by (6),
is true because ‘cs.stanford.edu’ is a descendant of ‘stan-
ford.edu’, and 8443 ∈ [8000..8443].
In general, when r0 restrictively inherits r, then any def-
inition “KA.r(···) ←− e” also implies “KA.r0(···) ←−
e”. Furthermore, any delegation “KA.r(···) ⇐= e” also
implies “KA.r0(···) ⇐= e”. The rationale is that when
r0 restrictively inherits r, then r0(···) represents a more re-
stricted permission than r(···), and r0(···) is weaker than
r(···) in the sense that any member of the KA.r(···) role
is also a member of the KA.r0(···) role. This is achieved
by having for each deﬁnition whose head uses r, also gen-
erating a deﬁnition that has head using r0.
Now we explain the difference between the delegation
“KA.r() ⇐= KB” and the containment “KA.r() ←−
KB.r()”. The delegation is stronger than the containment;
it implies the containment (about r) and another contain-
ment about r0: “KA.r0() ←− KB.r0()”. The contain-
ment about r only implies “KA.r0() ←− KB.r()”, which
5Credentials:
KFW.hostPerm(host ∈ currentAndDescendants(‘cs.stanford.edu’)) ⇐= KSA : KStanford.stanfordID() (1)
KSA.socketPerm(host ∈ descendants(’stanford.edu’), port∈ [8000..8443]) ←− KAlice (2)
KStanford.stanfordID(···) ←− KAlice (3)
Assuming socketPerm is the only role that restrictively inherits hostPerm, then (1) is equivalent to (4) and (5),
in which we use t as a shorthand for “currentAndDescendants(‘cs.stanford.edu’)”:
KFW.hostPerm(host ∈ t) ←− KSA.hostPerm(host ∈ t) ∩ KStanford.stanfordID() (4)
KFW.socketPerm(host ∈ t) ←− KSA.sockerPerm(host ∈ t) ∩ KStanford.stanfordID() (5)
From (2), (3), and (5), the request, represented by the following query, should be authorized:
KFW.socketPerm(host = ‘cs.stanford.edu’, port = 8443) ←− KAlice (6)
Figure 2. Scenario 2: Controlled Delegation of Permissions
is weaker than the containment about r0 above, since any
member of “KB.r()” would also be a member of KB.r0().
3.3 Identity-based Separation of Duty
The bank creates one ADSD, which declares six roles:
manager, cashier, auditor, twoCashiers, managerAndT-
woCashiers, and approval. The latter three are declared to
bemanifoldroles. Forsimplicity, weassumethattheseroles
do not contain parameters.
Three deﬁnitions implementing the approval policy
are given in Figure 3. Deﬁnition (1) means that FB’s
twoCashiers role contains every principal set {K1,K2}
such that both K1 and K2 are members of FB’s cashier
role, and K1 6= K2. Deﬁnition (2) means that FB’s man-
agerAndTwoCashiers role contains every principal set p =
{K} ∪ p1 such that K is a member of FB’s manager role
and p1 is a member of FB’s twoCashiers role. Deﬁnition
(3) means that the approval role contains every principal set
p = {K} ∪ p2 such that K is a member of FB’s auditor
role, p2 is a member of FB’s managerAndTwoCashiers, and
K 6∈ p2.
Identity roles and identity-based roles
When an employee holds multiple keys, the deﬁnitions in
Figure 3 may not achieve the goal of SoD, which requires
different users rather than keys be responsible for the trans-
action. In decentralized and public-key based systems, one
cannot assume that there is always an one-to-one relation-
ships between keys and users. Such a relationship is of-
ten very difﬁcult to enforce. In addition, there are often
practical considerations that dictate one user having multi-
ple keys. For example, a user may be required to change
keys regularly, and to assure smooth transition, two keys
may overlap. A user may also wish to have multiple keys in
the interest of privacy and/or key security.
To address this problem, FB can declare a new role, em-
ployeeNumber, with one parameter, “number”, and declare
this role to be an identity role. This means each physi-
cal user should correspond to one speciﬁc instance of the
identity role. For example, if Carl’s employee ID with FB
is ‘1111’, for any key KD held by Carl, FB only issues
“FB.employeeNumber(id=‘1111’) ←−KD”, and no other
employeeNumber credential containing KD.
FB may then declare the roles twoCashiers, man-
agerAndTwoCashiers, and approval to be based on the iden-
tity employeeNumber; we call these roles identity-based. In
contrast, we call normal roles principal-based. Members of
identity-based roles are computed based on the identities of
principals.
We say that a principal KD has an identity with respect
to KA.r if for some parameters, denoted by “···”, KD is a
member of KA.r(···); and we say that KA.r(···) is KD’s
identity wrt KA.r. Two principals K and K0 are equivalent
wrt KA.r, denoted by K ≡ K0[KA.r] (we omit “[KA.r]”
when it is clear from the context), if K and K0 are equal, or
they have the same identity wrt KA.r.
When using the rule “twoCashiers ←−cashier ⊗
cashier”, {K1,K2} is a member of twoCashiers only when
K1 and K2 each have identities and are not equivalent (wrt
FB’s employeeNumber role), and each of K1 and K2 is
equivalent to some member of FB’s cashier role, i.e., there
exists two members K0
1,K0
2 of FB’s cashier role such that
K1 ≡ K0
1 and K2 ≡ K0
2.
The notion we are using to ensure principals correspond
to different users can be generalized to support applications
of ⊗ to manifold roles. Two principal sets p1 and p2 are
equivalent if every principal in p1 is equivalent to one prin-
cipal in p2 and vice versa. Two principal sets p1 and p2 are
non-intersecting with respect to a given identity role if all
principals in p1 and p2 have identities and no principal in
p1 is equivalent to any principal in p2. Thus, when using
deﬁnition (3), the approval role contains every principal set
p = p1 ∪ p2 such that, p1 and p2 are non-intersecting, and
there exists p0
1 and p0
2 such that p1 ≡ p0
1, p2 ≡ p0
2, p0
1 is a
member of FB’s auditor role (in which case p0
1 must contain
only one principal, since auditor is not a manifold role), and
p0
2 is a member of FB’s managerAndTwoCashiers role.
6Access rules of FB
twoCashiers ←− cashier ⊗ cashier (1)
managerAndTwoCashiers ←− manager ￿ twoCashiers (2)
approval ←− auditor ⊗ managerAndTwoCashiers (3)
Figure 3. Scenario 3: Identity-based Separation of Duty
We have seen that identity can be used in determining
that two principals are not equivalent when a deﬁnition in-
volves ⊗. Identity also affects other kinds of deﬁnitions.
For example, when R is based on identity role r0, and we
have KA.R ←− KA.R1 ∩ KA.R2, if a user holds two keys
K1 and K2 so that K1 ∈ KA.R1 and K2 ∈ KA.R2, then
the user can get the permission encoded in KA.R when he
can prove that K1 ≡ K2 wrt KA.r0. In this case, we have
K1 ∈ R and K2 ∈ R. Again, this approach can be general-
ized to support applications of ∩ to manifold roles.
Our notion of identity role is somewhat similar to the no-
tion of primary keys in databases. It is declared to uniquely
identify something. This notion of identity is different from
the traditional ones, in that it is not global. Not every user
has to have an identity. Furthermore, different roles may be
based on different identity roles, just as different relations
in a databases may have different primary keys. We do not
think that it is practical to have a globally unique identity for
users at a global scale; however, it is often possible inside
one organization.
Our approach does not solve the difﬁcult problem of cre-
ating an infrastructure that uniquely identiﬁes the holder of
each principal. Rather we provide a mechanism to take ad-
vantage of such an infrastructure in policies when it is in
place.
Extending inheritance and projection
One ﬁnal issue bears on the Separation of Duty scenario.
In practice, it is unlikely that a credential contains only an
employee number. To avoid having to use multiple roles to
document information about one employee (these multiple
roles can still be included in one credential, as one creden-
tial can contain multiple deﬁnitions), one can do two things.
One approach is to ﬁrst declare the employeeNumber
role, then declare an employeeID role to extend employ-
eeNumber and add additional parameters. We call this ex-
tending inheritance, by way of contrast with the notion of
restrictive inheritance discussed in Section 3.2. In this case,
membership in the employeeID role implies membership in
the employeeNumber role. The intuition here is that every-
one that has an employee ID has an employee number, plus
some additional information carried in the new parameters.
Thus, extending inheritance enables additional information
to be added about role members, while restrictive inheri-
tance enables additional requirements to be associated with
a permission. When r0 extends r, then for each principal
K, K.r(f1 =?X1,...,f` =?X`) contains each member of
K.r0(f1 =?X1,...,f` =?X`), in which f1,...,f` are all
the parameters of r. Note that r0 may contain additional
parameters, but that the containment holds no matter what
values they take.
Another approach is to ﬁrst declare the employeeID role
and then declare the employeeNumber role as a projection
of the employeeID role to the number parameter. The effect
is essentially the same as extending inheritance. Projection
is useful when one wants to extract an identity role from a
role that is already deﬁned. Extending inheritance is use-
ful, for instance, if one wants to update an old student ID,
adding more parameters, but the new student ID credential
should still prove membership in the old student ID role,
sincesomeapplicationsmaystillusetheoldstudentIDrole.
3.4 Summary of the Extensions
We now summarize the key new features added to RT,
illustrated above by the scenarios. In Section 3.1, simple
delegation and linking delegation are new. As used there,
they are convenient syntactic sugars, simplifying the ex-
pression of requirements that can be equivalently expressed
by using simple containment and linking containment (See
Section 4.3). In Section 3.2, the tree types and the ability
to use ranges in the head of a rule are new. Also new is the
notion of restrictive inheritance, which creates a context in
whichsimpledelegation andlinkingdelegation arenotmere
syntactic sugars, but capture otherwise inexpressible mean-
ings. In Section 3.3, the notion of identity role, identity-
based role, extending inheritance, and projection are new.
4 RTML
RTML is deﬁned using XML Schema. The
schema deﬁnition of RTML deﬁnes three top level
elements: Credential, AccessRule, and
ApplicationDomainSpecification. The schema
for RTML uses data types in the XML Schema standard [2];
it also depends on the XML Signature standard [10], both
for credential signatures and for representing public keys.
ACredentialelementcanbedivided intothreeparts:
prologue, deﬁnitions, and veriﬁcation data.
74.1 Prologue of a Credential
The prologue part of a credential has the following format.
<Preamble>
<DefaultDomain uri="..." />
<ImportDomain uri="..." name="..."> *
<Principal> ...... </Principal> *
</Preamble>
<Issuer> ...... </Issuer>
<CredentialIdentifier> ......
</CredentialIdentifier>
The Preamble element contains reference information
for the rest of the credential: a DefaultDomain ele-
ment, zero or more ImportDomain elements, and zero
or more Principal elements. The “uri” attribute of
a DefaultDomain element speciﬁes the location of an
ADSDthatactsasthedefaultdomainofthecredential. Role
names used in the credential are assumed to be declared in
the default domain unless a domain is explicitly speciﬁed.
An ImportDomain element has two attributes: a “uri”
attribute that speciﬁes the location of the ADSD to be im-
ported, and a “name” attribute that is used to refer to the im-
ported domain. Role names declared in imported domains
can also be used in the current credential.
A Principal element gives the value of a princi-
pal, it can be a KeyValue element as deﬁned in the
XML Signature standard, an IntegerValue element, or
a StringValue element. See Section 4.6 for more dis-
cussion of this. To improve readability, principals, which
could be quite long, are included in the preamble so that
they can be referred to in a compact way elsewhere in the
credential.
The Issuer element contains a principal value, which
may be a Principal element or a PrincipalRef ele-
ment (which refers to a Principal element appearing in
the preamble).
The CredentialIdentifier element contains a
string that is unique among all credentials issued by the
same issuer having the same default domain. It could be
a serial number.
4.2 Roles in a Credential
After the prologue, a credential contains one or more
deﬁnitions. Before introducing these deﬁnitions, we ﬁrst
explain the building blocks used in these deﬁnitions.
A role can take the form of a RoleTerm element (which
is then assumed to be in the authority name space of the
issuer) or an ExternalRole element (which contains a
principal value and a RoleTerm).
A RoleTerm element has two attributes: name and do-
main (optional), which together identify a declared role.
When the domain attribute is not present, the name attribute
identiﬁes a role declared in the default domain of this cre-
dential. When the domain attribute is present, it should be
equal to the name attribute of one of the ImportDomain
elements, and the name attribute identiﬁes a role declared in
the corresponding ADSD.
A RoleTerm element contains zero or more
Parameter elements, each of which has two attributes:
name (required) and id (optional). The id parameter
uniquely identify the parameter in the current credential,
so that it can be referred to elsewhere. A Parameter
element optionally contains a constraint. A constraint may
be a value of one of the seven categories of data types
(which will be described in Section 4.6), a principal value,
a SpecialPrincipal, an Interval, a Set, or an
Equals element.
A constraint that is a value means that the pa-
rameter should be equal to this value. Currently, a
SpecialPrincipal element can take one of two val-
ues: ‘issuer’ (which refers to the issuer of the current cre-
dential) and ‘this’. The ‘this’ special principal can only be
used when deﬁning a singleton role; it refers to the principal
being evaluated to be the member of the role. The follow-
ing example from [20] illustrates the use of this: A company
Alpha gives a pay raise to an employee if someone autho-
rized to evaluate the employee says that his performance
was good. This can be encoded using “payRaise ←− eval-
uatorOf(this).goodPerformance”.
An Interval element contains an optional From ele-
ment and an optional To element, each of which contains
a value of an ordered data type. This represents an interval
set. The From (To) element has an attribute “included”,
indicating whether the bound in included in the interval.
When the From (To) element is not present, that side of
the interval is unbounded. A Set element includes one or
more values. An Equals element has one attribute, which
refers to another parameter in the deﬁnition, meaning that
this parameter should equal the other parameter.
4.3 Deﬁnitions
There are eight kinds of deﬁnitions, each containing a
HeadRoleTerm element and a body part. Before going
into the deﬁnitions, we also need the notion of dimension.
Each role has a dimension. A single-element role (default)
has dimension 1. Manifold roles require that the dimension
be explicitly declared. For a principal set to be a member
of the role, its size must be no more than the role’s di-
mension. For example, if R has dimension 2, then {K1}
and {K1,K2} may be members of A.R, but {K1,K2,K3}
cannot be. The reason for requiring that the dimension be
given is to ensure efﬁcient evaluation. (See [20] for further
details.)
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as the body part. While describing these deﬁnitions,
we use an abstract syntax, in which R represents the
HeadRoleTerm, R1 and R2 represents other role terms,
and Q (often with subscripts) represents roles, and in which
we assume KA is the issuer.
Simple Member R ←− D
The body part consists of one principal value, denoted D.
This deﬁnes the principal D to be the member of the role
KA.R. More precisely, the role KA.R contains any prin-
cipal that is equivalent to D. If R is principal-based, then
equivalency is the same as equality. If R is based on an
identity r0, then the equivalency may also be determined by
the identity.
Simple Containment R ←− Q
The body part consists of one role, denoted Q. The dimen-
sion of R should be no less than that of Q.
This deﬁnes the role KA.R to contain (every principal
set that is equivalent to some principal set that is a member
of) the role Q.
Intersection Containment R ←− Q1 ∩ ··· ∩ Qk
The body part consists of an Intersection element,
which contains two or more roles. The dimension of R
should be no less than the maximum dimension of Q1 ∩
··· ∩ Qk.
This deﬁnes KA.R to contain the intersection of all the
roles Q1,...,Qk. More precisely, KA.R contains any prin-
cipal set p that is equivalent to a member of Qj, for every
j = 1..k.
Linking Containment R ←− R1.R2
The body part consists of a LinkedRole element, which
contains two RoleTerm elements. The dimension of R
should be no less than that of R2.
When R1 is a singleton role, this deﬁnes the role KA.R
to contain every KB.R2, in which KB is a member of the
role KA.R1. When R1 is a manifold role, this deﬁnes,
for any principal set {KB1,...,kB`} that is a member of
KA.R1, KA.R contains the intersection of KB1.R2 ∩···∩
KB`.R2.
Product Containment R ←− Q1 ￿ ··· ￿ Qk
The body part consists of a Product element, which con-
tains two or more roles. The dimension of R should be no
less than the sum of the dimensions of Q1,...,Qk.
This deﬁnes the role KA.R to contain every principal set
p such that p = p1 ∪ ··· ∪ pk and for each 1 ≤ j ≤ k, there
exists p0
j such that pj ≡ p0
j and p0
j ∈ Qj.
Exclusive Product Containment R ←− Q1 ⊗ ··· ⊗ Qk
The body part consists of an ExclusiveProduct ele-
ment, which contains two or more roles. The dimension
of R should be no less than the sum of the dimensions of
Q1,...,Qk.
This deﬁnes the role KA.R to contain every principal set
p that satisﬁes the following condition: p = p1∪···∪pk, for
each i 6= j, pi ∩≡ pj = ∅ (pi and pj are non-intersecting),
and for each 1 ≤ j ≤ k, there exists p0
j such that pj ≡ p0
j
and p0
j ∈ Qj.
Simple Delegation R ⇐= B[: Qc]
The body part consists of a DelegateTo element (which
contains a principal value) and a Scope element (which
contains a role).
When Qc is not present, KA delegates its authority over
R to KB. In other words, KA trusts KB’s judgement on
assigning members to R. When Qc is present, KA wants to
control its delegation such that KB can only assign mem-
bers of Qc to be members of KA.R, in other words, KA.R
contains KB.R ∩ Qc.
Linking Delegation R ⇐= R1[: Qc]
The body part consists of a DelegateTo element (which
contains a role name) and a Control element (which con-
tains a role).
KA delegatesitsauthorityoverR tomembersofKA.R1.
The delegation is restricted to members of Qc. This implies
R ←− R1.R ∩ Qc.
4.4 Veriﬁcation Data
The veriﬁcation data part contains a ValidityTime
element, zero or more ValidityRule elements, and one
optional signature part.
The ValidityTime contains an IssueTime el-
ement, an optional NotBefore element, an optional
NotAfter element, and an optional LifeTime element.
The ﬁrst three elements each contain a speciﬁc time (using
the dateTime type in XML Schema), which we denote by
ti, tb, and te. The LifeTime element contains a duration
(using the duration type in XML Schema), we denote by δ.
A ValidityRule may specify a CRL location, an on-
line veriﬁcation server, etc. The details of the format of
ValidityRule are still being worked out.
When a party receives a certiﬁcate, it must ﬁrst check
whether the validity period of this certiﬁcate has begun, i.e.,
whether the current time, t, is later than tb. This allows
post-dated credentials, such as a student ID that becomes
valid only when the next academic year begins. The party
next determines the fresh time tf of the credential. Unless
the authorizer checks the credential’s validity, it assumes
tf = ti. Validity rules deﬁne how checks can be performed
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is checked and the credential is not revoked, one can up-
date tf to the issue time of the CRL (which is presumably
later than ti). The party then determines whether this cer-
tiﬁcate has expired. The expiration time is the earlier of
te and tf + δ. Thus, by setting the life time δ, the issuer
indicates that the credential should not be viewed as valid
unless the party has checked for revocation sufﬁciently re-
cently. Finally, the party determines whether the fresh time
is sufﬁciently recent for its own purposes.
The optional signature part is a Signature element as
speciﬁed in the XML Signature standard [10].
4.5 Access Rule
An AccessRule element is similar to a Credential
element. The differences are as follows. An AccessRule
does not have an Issuer; it has a RuleIdentifier
instead of a CredentialIdentifier, it does not have
ValidityRule or Signature. The rationale is that an
access rule is created and used locally; as such, the issuer
is implicit; no signature is needed; and a revoked rule is
simply removed.
4.6 Application Domain Speciﬁcation Documents
(ADSD’s)
An ADSD is represented by an
“ApplicationDomainSpecification” element,
which has a “uri” attribute, uniquely identifying this ADSD.
An ADSD has the following structure.
<IncludeDomain uri="..."
includeAll="true"|"false">
<Type name="..."> *
<RoleDeclaration name="..."> *
</IncludeDomain> *
<ImportDomain uri="..." name="..."> *
(type declaration) *
<PrincipalType>......</PrincipalType> ?
<RoleDeclaration ...> ...
</RoleDeclaration> *
Using Other ADSDs
In an IncludeDomain element, the “uri” attribute iden-
tiﬁes the ADSD being included. When the “includeAll” at-
tribute is true (default value), all the types and roles in the
included domain are included in the current domain, i.e.,
they are considered to be as if declared in the current do-
main. When the “includeAll” attribute is false, one can se-
lectthetypesandrolesbeingincluded byspecifyingthemin
the body of the element. One cannot include two types/roles
that have the same name.
In an ImportDomain element, the “name” attribute
serves as a short domain ID referring to the imported do-
main. One can use a type declared in an imported domain
by using the domain ID together with the type name. Im-
porting is useful when one wants to use two types that are
declared in two ADSDs and have the same name.
RTML has a system domain, which declares some
data types that are commonly used. Every ADSD au-
tomatically includes the system domain without using
IncludeDomain, and so one can use these types freely.
Type Declarations
Every type declaration has a “name” attribute, which must
take a value that is unique among all the data type names in
a domain. One cannot declare a type if a type with the same
name is already declared (possibly in an included domain).
Types are organized into seven different categories; the de-
tails of type declarations are left to Appendix A because of
space limitation.
Principal Type Declaration
By default, principals in RTML are public keys. However,
one can override thisby using a PrincipalType element
to declare the principal type to be an integer type or a string
type. ThismakesitpossibletouseRTMLtoencode policies
that involve principals other than public keys and to use the
RT system to make authorization decisions.
Whenever a role is declared, one needs to know which
type of principal it contains. Every ADSD has at most one
principal type. We say that an ADSD has a principal type if
it includes a domain that already has a principal type, it con-
tains a PrincipalType element, or it contains any role
declarations at all. If an ADSD gets its principal type from
declaring roles, the default public-key principal is assumed
to be used. Roles that use different principal types must not
be mixed in one credential.
The current RTML parser supports veriﬁcation when
principals are public keys. Credentials that are issued by
principals of other types are not veriﬁed. Applications that
use these credentials are responsible to perform any veriﬁ-
cation that is necessary.
Role Declarations
A RoleDeclaration element has ﬁve attributes: name,
issuerTraces (default rule), subjectTraces (fact), dimension
(1), and isIdentity (false). The “name” attribute should be
unique among all role names in the current domain. The
issuerTraces and subjectTraces attributes are related to dis-
tributed credential chain discovery, see [21] for more de-
tails. If the dimension is over 1, then the role is a manifold
role. If the isIdentity attribute is set to true, then this is an
identity role. When one issues credentials about the iden-
tity role, one should assign each physical user at most one
unique combination of parameter values. Of course, each
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an identity role, just like every other role.
A RoleDeclaration element may optionally con-
tain one of the following three elements: Restriction
(for restrictive inheritance), Extension (for extending in-
heritance), and Identity (for identity-based roles).
Finally, a RoleDeclaration may contain zero or
more Parameter elements; each one has a name attribute
and contains a Type element.
5 Related Work
In this section, we compare RTML with X.509, SAML,
SPKI/SDSI and KeyNote.
5.1 X.509
Thebasicauthorization-related meaning ofanX.509cer-
tiﬁcate is easily mapped into RTML. In an X.509 certiﬁcate,
the issuer attests to the association of a subject distinguished
name (DN) and the subject key. If an X509 role is declared,
then an X.509 certiﬁcate issued using key KA to subject
keyKB andsubjectDN{C=’US’,O=’StateU’,OU=’CSD’,
CN=’Bob Smith’} can be represented as the simple
member deﬁnition “KA.X509(dn={C=’US’, O=’StateU’,
OU=’CSD’, CN=’Bob Smith’}) ←−KB”. If the certiﬁcate
also has CA capabilities, then it also represents the simple
containment “KA.X509(dn=?X) ←−KB.X509(dn=?X)”.
A X.509 certiﬁcate does not contain the issuer key; in-
stead, it contains the DN of the issuer. A certiﬁcate is only
useful when a certiﬁcate chain is obtained so that the issuer
public key is determined. Given an ADSD encoding X.509
distinguished names, a standard X.509 certiﬁcate chain can
be interpreted as a chain of RTML deﬁnitions, enabling ex-
isting certiﬁcates to be meaningful within an RTML system.
The above approach cannot capture additional purposes
of an X.509 certiﬁcate beyond that of binding a DN to a key,
nor purposes encoded in organization’s non-standard exten-
sions. However, an organization can enable others to trans-
late implicit or explicit meanings of its X.509 certiﬁcates by
providing an ADSD that describes the role information con-
tained in them and a tool that extracts that role information
from certiﬁcates.
5.2 SAML
The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [13]
is an XML-based framework for exchanging security infor-
mation, expressed in the form of assertions about subjects.
Assertionscanconveyinformationaboutauthenticationacts
performed by subjects, attributes of subjects, and authoriza-
tion decisions about whether subjects are allowed to access
certain resources.
RTML has different purposes from SAML. SAML is
used to convey results of authentication and authorization,
but not credentials for doing so. RTML provides credential
formats for documenting properties (expressed in the forms
of roles) of subjects and documenting mechanisms to derive
these properties such as delegation.
5.3 SPKI/SDSI and KeyNote
We compare RTML with SPKI/SDSI and KeyNote from
three aspects: delegation structures, encoding of permis-
sions, and support for separation of duty. The conclusions
we draw are that RTML subsumes most of the expressive
power of SPKI/SDSI and KeyNote and provides a lot of ad-
ditional power. The places in which RTML is less expres-
sive result from design trade-offs made in favor of guaran-
teeing properties such as the tractability of analyzing autho-
rizations implied by RTML credentials and the interoper-
ability and predictability that accrue to strong typing.
Delegation Structures
RTML has more expressive delegation structures than those
in SPKI/SDSI and KeyNote.
SPKI has name certs and auth certs. Name certs can be
representedinRTMLusingsimplemember, simplecontain-
ment, andlinkedcontainment. Anauthcertrepresentsadel-
egation of the authority from its issuer to its subject, which
can be a principal, a SDSI name, and a threshold structure.
We will talk about threshold when discussing Separation of
Duty later.
Assume that we are given an auth cert with issuer KA,
authority R, and subject KB. If the delegation ﬂag is false,
then this is essentially “KA.R ←− KB”. If the delegation
ﬂag is true, then this can be represented using two deﬁni-
tions: KA.R ←− KB and KA.R ⇐= KB. If one wants
to use a SDSI name “KB’s N1’s ... Nk” as a subject, one
can deﬁne a new name “KA’s M” to have the same mem-
bers4 as “KB’s N1’s ... Nk” and use KA.R ←− KA.M,
and KA.R ⇐= M.
Note that since names in SDSI are only simple strings,
one cannot represent “student(university=?X) ⇐= univer-
sity(name=?X)”or“discount←−KACM.acmMember(since
≤ 2001)” in SPKI/SDSI. Furthermore, SPKI/SDSI does not
have intersection, which is needed in Scenario 1, or con-
trolled delegation, which is needed in Scenario 2. When a
principal allows a subject to further delegate a permission,
it cannot restrict to whom the subject delegates.
A KeyNote request is characterized by a list of ﬁelds,
which are name/value pairs. In KeyNote, credentials and
policies (access rules) are called assertions. An assertion
has conditions written in an expression language, which
4This can be achieved by introducing new intermediate roles and deﬁ-
nitions. See [21] for details.
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sertion is that, if the licensees support a request, and the
request satisﬁes the conditions, then the issuer supports the
request as well.
KeyNote’s delegation structures in assertions are more
restricted than those in SPKI/SDSI. Delegation in KeyNote
is always transitive, one cannot grant a permission to a prin-
cipal without enabling the principal to further grant the per-
mission. Furthermore, KeyNote assertions have to explic-
itly list the principals involved in the delegation. There-
fore, using KeyNote assertions, one cannot express a dele-
gation “student() ⇐= university()” (which is expressible in
SPKI/SDSI). See [18, 20] for more discussion of this limi-
tation.
Encoding of Permissions
Permissions are encoded in RTML by using role terms,
whose parameters are typed and can be constrained.
In SPKI, authorities are encoded in tags, which are un-
typed lists, e.g., (ftp (ftp.stanford.edu) (* preﬁx /pub/test/)).
One cannot express the permission to connect all hosts in a
domain, since the root of a domain goes at the end of the
string, and SPKI does not have a (* sufﬁx) operator. There
are also other limitations. For example, one cannot encode
a permission that requires two parameters being equal.
While it is not clear that everything that can be expressed
in tags can be expressed using role terms, we do claim the
following. First, all the examples we encountered in SPKI
literature can be expressed using role terms. Second, the
ability to ﬂexibly reﬁne permissions that is allowed by un-
typed lists in SPKI can be achieved by using restrictive
inheritance in RTML. Third, the untyped list approach in
SPKI has been found to have certain problems. For exam-
ple, in [15], it has been shown that the intersection between
two tags may not be ﬁnitely representable using tags.
InKeyNote, thepermissionsdelegated inanassertionare
represented by conditions on ﬁelds. These conditions are
very expressive, including formula constructed using inte-
gers with function symbols {+,−,∗,/,%,ˆ} and predicates
{=,6=,<,>,≤,≥}. KeyNote conditions also include reg-
ular expressions. We believe that this is more expressive
than role terms in RTML. However, this expressiveness of
KeyNote comes at the cost of the ability to analyze KeyNote
assertions. In [19], it has been shown that it is undecidable
to compute the set of all requests that a set of KeyNote as-
sertions authorizes. Note that whether any speciﬁc request
is authorized by a set of assertions can still be determined
efﬁciently. However, there does not exist an algorithm to
perform analysis of all the requests being authorized by a
set of assertions. In fact, it is undecidable even when there
is only one assertion delegating to a single entity, and the
question is just whether the assertion authorizes any request
at all. On the other hand, the constraints in RTML are de-
signed so that the implications of a set of RTML credentials
can be efﬁciently computed. We feel that the constraints
in RTML provides sufﬁcient expressive power for most ap-
plications, as all the examples in [3] can be expressed in
RTML.
Support for Separation of Duty
Both SPKI and KeyNote allow delegation to k-out-of-n
threshold structures, in which one explicitly lists the n prin-
cipals. It has been argued before that such threshold struc-
tures are inconvenient [17]. For example, to express the
access rule “twoCashier ←−cashier ⊗ cashier”, one needs
to explicitly list all the cashiers in the access rule, and this
rule needs to be changed each time members in the cashier
role change.
A threshold structure requires agreement of multiple
principals drawn from a single list. When the policy is to
require different principals drawn from the membership of
different roles, it is not clear that threshold can help. It
seems that the policy writer needs to enumerate all the prin-
cipal sets that are entitled to the permission and to delegate
to each of them directly.
When a user may hold more than one keys, thresholds
seemtobeuseless. Forexample, ifnuserseachhold2keys,
then a policy that requires 2 out of n users would require 2n
different thresholds using the straightforward approach. It
is better to directly express all the pairs that are eligible to
access, as there are 2n(n − 1) such pairs.
6 Conclusion
This paper describes the following advances in the RT
framework that broaden its applicability: new data types
to encode permissions involving structured resources and
ranges; restrictive inheritance of roles for ﬂexible reﬁne-
ment of permissions; and notions of identity roles and
identity-based roles to address issues when a physical user
holds multiple keys. In addition to these extensions moti-
vated by speciﬁc applications, this paper describes RTML,
an XML-based data representation for RT policies and cre-
dentials. RTML establishes a precise format for RT creden-
tials and policies, help enabling the deployment of the RT
framework.
Compared with previous TM systems such as
SPKI/SDSI and KeyNote, RTML has the following
distinguishing features.
• RTML supports more ﬂexible delegation. In RTML,
one can delegate to principals who are members of cer-
tain roles, and can control the scope of a delegation.
• RTML addresses the issue of vocabulary agree-
ment. Application Domain Speciﬁcation Documents
in RTML ensure uniqueness of role names, and enable
12credentials to be strongly-typed, further helping to en-
sure interoperability and to reduce the possibility of er-
rors in writing policies and credentials and unintended
interaction of credentials.
• RTML supports Separation of Duty policies in a way
that is more expressive than previous TM systems.
Furthermore, RTML addresses the situation when one
user holds more than one keys.
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14A Type Declarations in ADSDs
In the following, we present type declarations in ADSDs.
Every type declaration has a “name” attribute, which we
omit in the presentation below. Under each category, we
also describe how a constant value of a type in that category
is represented.
Integer types
An IntegerType element has two additional required at-
tributes: max and min. It also has four optional attributes:
step (default 1), base (0), includeMin (true), and include-
Max (true). The legal values of this type include all integer
value v’s such that v = base + k ∗ step for some integer k
and that min ≤ v ≤ max, where ≤ (≥) should be replaced
by <(>) if includeMin (includeMax) is set to false. For ex-
ample, one can declare a type to contain all the numbers v
such that v mod 3 = 1 and 0 ≤ v ≤ 100.
A constant of an integer type is represented using an
IntegerValue element. The following integer types are
declared in the system domain: long, int, short, byte, bit,
unsigned int, unsigned short, and unsigned byte.
Decimal types
A DecimalType element is similar to an IntegerType
element, in that it has the same attributes. However, the
attributes min, max, base, and step now take decimal values.
Valid values of this type are deﬁned in the same way as are
those of an integer type. A constant is represented using a
DecimalValue element. No decimal type is declared in
the system domain.
Enumeration Types
An EnumType element has three optional attributes: ig-
noreCase (false), which speciﬁes whether to ignore case
when comparing two enumeration values; ordered (false),
whichspeciﬁeswhetherthistypeisordered; andsize, which
speciﬁes how many values this type has. If this type is or-
dered, then one can use intervals to constrain parameters
of this type. The EnumType element contains a list of
EnumValue elements, which enumerates the legal values
of this type.
A constant is represented using an EnumValue ele-
ment. The system domain contains a boolean type, which
is declared as an EnumType. Other possible examples of
enumeration types include day of week, degree, etc.
String types
A StringType element has two optional attributes: ig-
noreCase (false) and ordered (false), which have the same
meanings as in the case of enumeration types. A constant
is represented using a StringValue element. The sys-
tem domain declares two types of this category: string and
case-insensitive string.
Tree types
A TreeType element has two additional required at-
tributes: separator and order. These two values determine
what a tree value looks like. For example, a type for DNS
names has “.” as separator and the order is “rootLast”, while
a type for Unix ﬁle paths has “/” as separator and the order
is “rootFirst”.
A TreeValue element contains a string such as
“/usr/home” and three optional attributes: includeCurrent
(default true), includeChildren (false), and includeDescen-
dants (false). The default value means that only the current
node is included. One can set these attributes to reﬂect other
choices. Note that children are considered to be a subset of
descendants, and so when includeDescendants is set to true,
all children are also included, no matter what the value of
includeChildren is.
The system declares two types of this category: dns and
path.
Record types
A RecordType element contains one or more Field el-
ements; each has a name attribute and contains a Type el-
ement. The Type element has two attributes: name (re-
quired) and domain (optional); they refer to a type already
declared, i.e., declared in an included domain or before the
current declaration. This guarantees that no recursion oc-
curs with record types.
A Record element can be used to constrain a parameter
of a record type; it contains one or more ﬁelds, each having
an optional constraint.
Examples of record types include IP addresses, names,
and street addresses.
Date/Time types
Date/Time types are treated differently from other data
types. RTML borrows the following standard date/time
types deﬁned in XML Schema [2]: date, time, dateTime,
gYear, gYearMonth, gMonth, gMonthDay, and gDay. These
types can be used as if they are declared in the system do-
main. RTMLdoesnotsupportdeﬁning newdata/timetypes.
A TimeValue element can contain any value that is legal
for one of the above types .
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B.1 The System ADSD
The system ADSD consists of the data types declared as follows and date/times from XML Schema. It is automatically
included in every other ADSD.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<ApplicationDomainSpecification uri=""
xmlns="http://crypto.stanford.edu/dc/RTMLv1.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://crypto.stanford.edu/dc/RTMLv1.0
http://crypto.stanford.edu/˜ninghui/rtml/RTMLv1.0q.xsd">
<IntegerType name="long" max="9223372036854775807" min="-9223372036854775808"/>
<IntegerType name="int" max="2147483647" min="-2147483648"/>
<IntegerType name="short" max="32767" min="-32768"/>
<IntegerType name="byte" max="127" min="-128"/>
<IntegerType name="bit" max="1" min="0"/>
<IntegerType name="unsigned int" max="4294967295" min="0"/>
<IntegerType name="unsigned short" max="65535" min="0"/>
<IntegerType name="unsigned byte" max="255" min="0"/>
<EnumType name="boolean">
<EnumValue>false</EnumValue>
<EnumValue>true</EnumValue>
</EnumType>
<StringType name="string"/>
<StringType name="case-insensitive string" ignoreCase="true"/>
<TreeType name="dns" separator="." order="rootLast"/>
<TreeType name="path" separator="/" order="rootFirst"/>
<RecordType name="email address">
<Field name="user name"> <Type name="string"/> </Field>
<Field name="server"> <Type name="dns"/> </Field>
</RecordType>
<RecordType name="person name">
<Field name="first name"> <Type name="string"/> </Field>
<Field name="last name"> <Type name="string"/> </Field>
</RecordType>
<RecordType name="distinguished name">
<Field name="CN"> <Type name="string"/> </Field>
<Field name="OU"> <Type name="string"/> </Field>
<Field name="O"> <Type name="string"/> </Field>
<Field name="CN"> <Type name="string"/> </Field>
</RecordType>
</ApplicationDomainSpecification>
B.2 Sample XML Elements for Scenario 1
The following deﬁnition corresponding to EPub’s discount policy in Scenario 1.
<IntersectionContainment>
<HeadRoleTerm name="Discount"/>
<Intersection>
<ExternalRole>
<PrincipalRef ref="K_ACM"/>
<RoleTerm name="ACM Member">
<Parameter name="name" id="memberName"/>
<Parameter name="since">
16<Interval>
<To><TimeValue>2001</TimeValue></To>
</Interval>
</Parameter>
</RoleTerm>
</ExternalRole>
<RoleTerm name="student">
<Parameter name="name"> <Equals ref="memberName"/> </Parameter>
<Parameter name="program">
<Set>
<EnumValue>M.S.</EnumValue>
<EnumValue>Ph.D.</EnumValue>
</Set>
</Parameter>
</RoleTerm>
</Intersection>
</IntersectionContainment>
B.3 Sample XML Elements for Scenario 2
The following is the ADSD that declares the “hostPerm” role.
<ApplicationDomainSpecification
uri="http://crypto.stanford.edu/˜ninghui/rtml/examples/FWADSD1.xml"
xmlns="http://crypto.stanford.edu/dc/RTMLv1.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://crypto.stanford.edu/dc/RTMLv1.0
http://crypto.stanford.edu/˜ninghui/rtml/RTMLv1.0q.xsd">
<RoleDeclaration name="hostPerm">
<Parameter name="host"> <Type name="dns"/> </Parameter>
</RoleDeclaration>
</ApplicationDomainSpecification>
The following is the ADSD that declares the “socketPerm” role, which restrictively inherits “hostPerm”.
<ApplicationDomainSpecification
uri="http://crypto.stanford.edu/˜ninghui/rtml/examples/FWADSD2.xml"
xmlns="http://crypto.stanford.edu/dc/RTMLv1.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://crypto.stanford.edu/dc/RTMLv1.0
http://crypto.stanford.edu/˜ninghui/rtml/RTMLv1.0q.xsd">
<IncludeDomain uri="http://crypto.stanford.edu/˜ninghui/rtml/examples/FWADSD1.xml"/>
<RoleDeclaration name="socketPerm">
<Restriction> <BaseRole name="hostPerm"/> </Restriction>
<Parameter name="port"> <Type name="unsigned short"/> </Parameter>
</RoleDeclaration>
</ApplicationDomainSpecification>
The following is the deﬁnition element of KFW’s delegation to KSA.
<SimpleDelegation>
<HeadRoleTerm name="hostPerm">
<Parameter name="host">
<TreeValue includeCurrent="true" includeDescendents="true">
cs.stanford.edu
</TreeValue>
</Parameter>
</HeadRoleTerm>
17<DelegateTo>
<PrincipalRef ref="K_SA"/>
</DelegateTo>
<Control>
<ExternalRole>
<PrincipalRef ref="K_Stanford"/>
<RoleTerm name="StudentID" domain="Stanford"/>
</ExternalRole>
</Control>
</SimpleDelegation>
The following is the deﬁnition element of KSA’s delegation to KAlice.
<SimpleMember>
<HeadRoleTerm name="socketPerm">
<Parameter name="host">
<TreeValue includeDescendents="true" includeCurrent="false">stanford.edu</TreeValue>
</Parameter>
<Parameter name="port">
<Interval>
<From><IntegerValue>8000</IntegerValue></From>
<To><IntegerValue>8443</IntegerValue></To>
</Interval>
</Parameter>
</HeadRoleTerm>
<PrincipalRef ref="K_Alice"/>
</SimpleMember>
B.4 A Complete, Signed Credential
We now give a complete credential. The signature is generated using the Apache XML Security tool.
<Credential
xmlns="http://crypto.stanford.edu/dc/RTMLv1.0"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://crypto.stanford.edu/dc/RTMLv1.0
http://crypto.stanford.edu/˜ninghui/rtml/RTMLv1.0q.xsd
http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#
http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/xmldsig-core-schema.xsd">
<Preamble>
<DefaultDomain uri="http://crypto.stanford.edu/dc/rtml/x509adsd.xml">
</DefaultDomain>
<Principal id="IssuerKey">
<ds:KeyValue>
<ds:DSAKeyValue>
<P>
/X9TgR11EilS30qcLuzk5/YRt1I870QAwx4/gLZRJmlFXUAiUftZPY1Y+r/F9bow9subVWzXgTuA
HTRv8mZgt2uZUKWkn5/oBHsQIsJPu6nX/rfGG/g7V+fGqKYVDwT7g/bTxR7DAjVUE1oWkTL2dfOu
K2HXKu/yIgMZndFIAcc=
</P>
<Q>l2BQjxUjC8yykrmCouuEC/BYHPU=</Q>
<G>
9+GghdabPd7LvKtcNrhXuXmUr7v6OuqC+VdMCz0HgmdRWVeOutRZT+ZxBxCBgLRJFnEj6EwoFhO3
zwkyjMim4TwWeotUfI0o4KOuHiuzpnWRbqN/C/ohNWLx+2J6ASQ7zKTxvqhRkImog9/hWuWfBpKL
Zl6Ae1UlZAFMO/7PSSo=
</G>
<Y>
18vLpQw3oYKp/iAL8drwI1teVtu5TGt8+1Z7YyUuI/ztvd0ittFVw/udC7HEyLF1A34saKGoES3X3V
wsr9ilpx6e1tHFSHHVo87GsDXdNlIKUKkJhtysttrlOStBG7hcKcdVISdaw/Pvyfod5oAhTA0Tw1
9sAeigAelUO4qsyr/20=
</Y>
</ds:DSAKeyValue>
</ds:KeyValue>
</Principal>
<Principal id="SubjectKey">
<ds:KeyValue>
<ds:RSAKeyValue>
<ds:Modulus>
ujN6AfAP1GhzwiXlP2DwJod5ivWw7bnQA903bTQmMhN1kkPxcSEmMPW1f+yof3cza0Xz9WgeBc9+
XwM15Ot/J4KGYHoDrLlyr1A2uKnRtixJphpJGCbw09CoCAHEwC25+93c7aG1j3kWoKBQqn9fCH3s
QO5dt1DxNoq3ah0jq0c=
</ds:Modulus>
<ds:Exponent>AQAB</ds:Exponent>
</ds:RSAKeyValue>
</ds:KeyValue>
</Principal>
</Preamble>
<Issuer><PrincipalRef ref="IssuerKey"></PrincipalRef></Issuer>
<SimpleMember>
<HeadRoleTerm name="DistinguishedName">
<Parameter name="subjectDN">
<Record>
<Field name="CN"><StringValue>Bob Smith</StringValue></Field>
<Field name="OU"><StringValue>CSD</StringValue></Field>
<Field name="O"><StringValue>StateU</StringValue></Field>
<Field name="C"><StringValue>US</StringValue></Field>
</Record>
</Parameter>
</HeadRoleTerm>
<PrincipalRef ref="SubjectKey"></PrincipalRef>
</SimpleMember>
<ValidityTime>
<IssueTime>2002-08-20T13:20:00Z</IssueTime>
<NotAfter>2003-08-20T13:20:00Z</NotAfter>
</ValidityTime>
<Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<SignedInfo>
<CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315">
</CanonicalizationMethod>
<SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#dsa-sha1">
</SignatureMethod>
<Reference URI="">
<Transforms>
<Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature">
</Transform>
<Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315#WithComments">
</Transform>
</Transforms>
<DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"></DigestMethod>
<DigestValue>vgeAJujgY/eHjj0ReTKAywqSPk8=</DigestValue>
</Reference>
</SignedInfo>
<SignatureValue>cCH3MJMCY1Bb1MGn5HYfS4mHrApVhguBNFjAHjV+5MuCLdemhyC61Q==</SignatureValue>
<KeyInfo>
<KeyValue>
19<DSAKeyValue>
<P>
/X9TgR11EilS30qcLuzk5/YRt1I870QAwx4/gLZRJmlFXUAiUftZPY1Y+r/F9bow9subVWzXgTuA
HTRv8mZgt2uZUKWkn5/oBHsQIsJPu6nX/rfGG/g7V+fGqKYVDwT7g/bTxR7DAjVUE1oWkTL2dfOu
K2HXKu/yIgMZndFIAcc=
</P>
<Q>l2BQjxUjC8yykrmCouuEC/BYHPU=</Q>
<G>
9+GghdabPd7LvKtcNrhXuXmUr7v6OuqC+VdMCz0HgmdRWVeOutRZT+ZxBxCBgLRJFnEj6EwoFhO3
zwkyjMim4TwWeotUfI0o4KOuHiuzpnWRbqN/C/ohNWLx+2J6ASQ7zKTxvqhRkImog9/hWuWfBpKL
Zl6Ae1UlZAFMO/7PSSo=
</G>
<Y>
Eln5/htZP51p7Y/Y1+zZOSSmoi2fQS0deniScan3990xy33RrPfF5odqEVmVYfTzFfKEz94aUXEY
qY2VGVRCKrAZThk1SwoOB+UyfNSVjoqa4fppIQpTalK/JeR7uxQUr0Aeop68nr2u49GijYiLyvL3
x04lGaZ8jUYZL3gZTNI=
</Y>
</DSAKeyValue>
</KeyValue>
</KeyInfo>
</Signature>
</Credential>
20